Uncertain R&D Outcomes and Cooperation in R&D by Kabiraj, Abhishek & Kabiraj, Tarun
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Uncertain R&D Outcomes and
Cooperation in R&D
Abhishek Kabiraj and Tarun Kabiraj
HSBC Pvt. Ltd., Kolkata, Indian Statistical Institute, India
31 January 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/94676/
MPRA Paper No. 94676, posted 28 June 2019 09:19 UTC
 1 
 
 
Uncertain R&D Outcomes and Cooperation in R&D*  
 
By 
Abhishek Kabiraj 
HSBC Pvt. Ltd., Kolkata 
 
and  
 
Tarun Kabiraj 
Indian Statistical Institute, India 
 
(January 2019) 
Abstract: The present paper provides a brief survey of some of the papers dealing with R&D 
uncertainty. This helps us identify which factors are more favourable for cooperative R&D and 
which factors are not. The paper provides the analysis under a unified framework. We take the 
classic paper by Marjit (1991) as the benchmark case, and then proceeds to examine whether, 
or to what extent, Marjit result will undergo a change with respect to different assumptions 
related to R&D investment. 
 
* Correspondence to: Tarun Kabiraj, Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 
203 B. T. Road, Kolkata 700108, India.  
E-mail: tarunkabiraj@hotmail.com; Fax: (91) (33) 2577 8893. 
 
 
 2 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Economic growth and development of a country depends, to a large extent, on the country’s 
capability of doing research and development (R&D) successfully. But R&D activity involves 
a huge expenditure in setting a research lab, installing scientific instruments and recruiting 
scientific personnel. It requires well-directed and well-coordinated efforts. Even after such 
investment, an R&D firm does not know a priori whether it will come out with a successful 
innovation. This means, R&D outcome is uncertain. Often a success comes only after many 
failures. There is also uncertainty in commercializing and marketing the innovation. Even when 
success occurs, the innovator does not know whether it will be able to appropriate the required 
amount of profits before the innovation becomes obsolete. This is because of the problem of 
spillovers, free riding and imitation of the R&D outcome by the rivals who become competitive 
at the market place. All these problems lead to under-investment in R&D.1 So it is an important 
concern of the policy makers about how to provide sufficient incentives to the private firms for 
doing R&D.  
Given the concern for under-investment in R&D, most of the governments extend fiscal 
support to the investors in the form of R&D subsidy, cheap credit facility and tax concessions. 
To the problem of imitation and leaking out of knowledge, the government of a country 
provides patent protection to the new innovations so that the imitators cannot use or copy the 
innovation. However, it all depends on the effectiveness and enforcement of patent laws. Weak 
patent protection can hardly protect innovations from copying. Patent protection cannot fully 
protect the innovation, it raises the cost of imitation.2 
Under these circumstances, cooperative R&D is suggested to be the way-out of the problem of 
high R&D cost, uncertainty and spillovers of knowledge. By cooperating the firms can avoid 
duplicating scarce resources, and share research cost and output as well as uncertainty (Katz, 
1986). Cooperative R&D is an ex ante agreement among the member firms on sharing R&D 
expenses and results. Most of the countries now-a-days promote cooperative research.3  Most 
popular form of cooperative research is research joint venture or RJV. Under RJV, the firms 
                                                          
1 There are theoretical and empirical literature showing under-investment in R&D due to spillovers of knowledge.  
See, for instance, Spence (1984), Jaffe (1986), Ornaghi (2006), and Bakhtiari and Breunig (2018). 
2 Griliches (1990) found to have inverse relation between the degree of patent protection and the level of spillovers.  
3 In USA, the National Cooperative Research Act 1984 was passed, and following this a large number of  
cooperative ventures had been registered (Vonortas, 1997). 
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conduct research in a single lab and share R&D cost and output. The firms can also write a 
contract to do R&D independently in their own labs, but share the R&D outcome of any lab.   
This has led to the question of whether R&D will be cooperative or non-cooperative. This is 
the problem of the choice of R&D institution or organization. A substantial literature has 
emerged discussing this question. The pioneering work in this field is d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988). The paper focuses on R&D spillovers and studies whether R&D investment 
will be cooperative or non-cooperative. When spillovers are high, firms generally go for 
cooperative research. The work has been extended by Kamien et al. (1992) to the case of 
differentiated duopoly, and by Suzumura (1992) to the case of oligopoly. Mota (1992) 
discussed the choice under vertical product differentiation. Amir et al. (2003) studies the 
problem when spillovers are endogenous. 
These works, however, do not consider uncertainty in R&D outcome. Marjit (1991) was 
pioneer to show that uncertainty alone can result in cooperative research. It was shown that if 
probability of success in R&D is either high or low, cooperative research should occur, 
otherwise non-cooperative R&D would be preferred. Then following Marjit (1991) a number 
of papers have been contributed to the literature examining the choice problem (see, for 
instance, Combs (1992); Choi (1992, 1993), Kabiraj (2006, 2007), Mukherjee and Marjit 
(2004), Kabiraj and Chattopadhyay (2015), and Kabiraj and Kabiraj (2019)).4 All these papers 
have assumed that the product market is non-cooperative. However, cooperation in production 
may give additional incentive to R&D (d’Aspremont and Jacquimin (1988) and Kamient et al. 
(1992)). In a three-firm framework, Kabiraj and Mukherjee (2000) have studied whether 
cooperation in production will induce the firms to cooperate in R&D, and vice versa. Silipo and 
Weiss (2005) have studied the choice between cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in the 
presence of both spillovers and uncertainty. 
The purpose of the present paper is to provide a brief survey of some of those works dealing 
with R&D uncertainty. This will help us identify which factors are more favorable for 
cooperative R&D and which factors are not. We provide the analysis in the same frame. We 
consider Marjit (1991) as the benchmark case, and then examine whether, or to what extent, 
Marjit result will undergo a change with respect to different assumptions related to R&D 
                                                          
4 Mukherjee and Ray (2009) discussed the problem when there is uncertainty in patent approval, but the R&D 
outcome is certain. Kabiraj (2018) studied the problem in a three-firm framework when cooperative research 
takes the form of RJV or knowledge sharing. 
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investment. In this sense, the present paper is a review of Marjit (1991). In the context of Marjit 
(1991) model we consider various scenarios like: product or process innovation; drastic or non-
drastic innovation; patent protection may or may not be available; imitation may or may not be 
possible; technology transfer may or may not be allowed; cooperative R&D be conducted in a 
single or more than one lab; possibility of more than one innovation; and incomplete 
information. We show that patent protection and technology transfer will increase incentives 
for non-cooperative research whereas imitation and incomplete information will tilt the choice 
towards cooperative R&D. However, the qualitative result of Marjit in these cases will remain 
unaltered. On the other hand, duplicating research under cooperation will substantially change 
the Marjit result. We also see how the size of the innovation, whether small or large, may affect 
the choice of R&D organization. Readers, perhaps, will understand how tinkering one or the 
other assumption might generate a different result. 
The plan of the paper is the following. In section 2, we first provide Marjit (1991) model as the 
benchmark case, and then in a number of subsections we study the effect of the change of one 
or the other assumption underlying the model and examine to what extent Marjit (1991) results 
are robust. In section 3, we suggest some possible extensions for future research. Finally, 
section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Framework of Analysis 
Consider, initially, a symmetric duopoly market for a homogeneous product. Two firms, firm 
1 and firm 2, simultaneously interact in R&D and production. They play a two-stage game. 
Assuming that non-cooperative research is always profitable, the firms in the first stage decide 
whether to conduct R&D cooperatively or non-cooperatively. Then in the second stage, subject 
to the realization of the R&D outcome, they play a la Cournot and compete non-cooperatively 
in the product market.  
Each research lab requires an investment 𝑅 > 0 targeting a specified (product or process) 
innovation, but the research outcome is uncertain, that is, research may lead to a success or 
failure. When 𝑅 is invested, the probability of success of a research lab is 𝜌, 0 < 𝜌 < 1. If both 
firms come up with the innovation, the market will be symmetric duopoly, but if only one firm 
comes up with the innovation, the market will be either monopoly or asymmetric duopoly 
depending on the size and nature of innovation. Below we first provide briefly the Marjit (1991) 
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model as the benchmark case and identify some assumptions underlying the model stated 
implicitly or explicitly. Then relaxing one or the other assumption we examine to what extent 
Marjit (1991) results are sensitive to a particular assumption. 
 
2.0 Benchmark Case: Marjit (1991) Model 
Marjit (1991) assumes process innovation that reduces the unit cost of production. Further, it 
is assumed that the innovation is `drastic’ (or major) in the sense that the firm which alone 
adopts the innovation emerges as a monopolist in the product market and the other firm ceases 
to operate. Finally, it is assumed that under cooperative R&D firms conduct research in a single 
lab, sharing both R&D cost and R&D result, hence they form an RJV. Denoting the pre- and  
post-R&D symmetric duopoly profits of a firm by 𝜋 and 𝜋𝑑  respectively and monopoly profit 
by 𝜋𝑚,5 the expected payoffs of a firm under cooperative (𝐶) and non-cooperative (𝑁𝐶) R&D 
will be given by,  
 𝐸(𝐶0) = 𝜌𝜋𝑑 + (1 − 𝜌)𝜋 −
𝑅
2
                                                                        (1) 
 𝐸(𝑁𝐶0) = 𝜌2𝜋𝑑 +  𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝜋𝑚 + (1 − 𝜌)2𝜋 − 𝑅                                       (2)  
Therefore, cooperative R&D is to be preferred to non-cooperative R&D if and only if  
𝐸(𝐶0) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶0)    ⟺     𝜌(1 − 𝜌) <
𝑅
2[𝜋𝑚−(𝜋𝑑+𝜋)]
                                        (3)            
Clearly, the RHS of (3) is positive and constant, and the LHS, 𝜌(1 − 𝜌), is strictly inverted U-
shaped with a unique maximum at 𝜌 = (
1
2
) and the value of the function is 0 both at 𝜌 = 0 and 
𝜌 = 1. Then Marjit (1991) result can be stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 [Marjit (1991) Result]: If 𝑅 is not very large, ∃ 𝜌 & 𝜌, 0 <  𝜌 < 𝜌 < 1, such 
that cooperative R&D is preferred to non-cooperative R&D ∀𝜌 𝜖 (0, 𝜌) ∪ (𝜌, 1) ; otherwise, 
non-cooperative R&D is preferred.  
                                                          
5 In the paper, as we can see, no result will change if 𝜋 ≥ 0. 
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Thus Marjit (1991) result states that cooperative R&D will occur if the probability of success 
is either small or large. When the probability of success is in an intermediate range, non-
cooperative R&D will occur.  
It can be noted that although Marjit (1991) assumed (drastic) process innovation, it can easily 
be interpreted as product innovation We may assume that initially production is not viable 
because each firm’s marginal cost of production is sufficiently high (so 𝜋 = 0). But the process 
innovation reduces costs and makes the production viable; hence this is equivalent to product 
innovation.  
In general, irrespective of whether process innovation is drastic or non-drastic, let 𝜋𝑆𝑆 denote 
the payoff of a firm when both the firms adopt the successful innovation, and 𝜋𝐹𝐹  denote the 
payoff when none has successful innovation. Similarly, when only one firm has the successful 
innovation, its payoff is 𝜋𝑆𝐹  and the other firm’s payoff is 𝜋𝐹𝑆. Then under Cournot 
competition we must have: 
 𝜋𝑆𝐹 > 𝜋𝑆𝑆 > 𝜋𝐹𝐹 > 𝜋𝐹𝑆                                                                        
Clearly, when innovation is drastic, we have: 𝜋𝑆𝐹 = 𝜋𝑚, 𝜋𝑆𝑆 = 𝜋𝑑 , 𝜋𝐹𝑆 = 0  and 𝜋𝐹𝐹 = 𝜋, 
and if the innovation is non-drastic, then 𝜋𝑆𝐹 < 𝜋𝑚 and 𝜋𝐹𝑆 > 0 . So under process 
innovation, (1) (2) and (3) can be rewritten, more generally as:   
𝐸(𝐶 ∗) = 𝜌𝜋𝑆𝑆 + (1 − 𝜌)𝜋𝐹𝐹 −
𝑅
2
                                                           (1*)  
𝐸(𝑁𝐶 ∗) = 𝜌2𝜋𝑆𝑆 +  𝜌(1 − 𝜌)(𝜋𝑆𝐹 + 𝜋𝐹𝑆) + (1 − 𝜌)2𝜋𝐹𝐹 − 𝑅                 (2*) 
𝐸(𝐶 ∗) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶 ∗)    ⟺     𝜌(1 − 𝜌) <
𝑅
2[𝜋𝑆𝐹+𝜋𝐹𝑆−𝜋𝑆𝑆−𝜋𝐹𝐹] 
                          (3*) 
Here we assume that [𝜋𝑆𝐹 + 𝜋𝐹𝑆 − 𝜋𝑆𝑆 − 𝜋𝐹𝐹] > 0 .6  So Marjit result, as stated in Proposition 
1, holds for non-drastic innovation. 
In the following analysis we focus on the following assumptions stated explicitly or implicitly 
in Marjit (1991) model. 
(A1) Single process innovation; 
                                                          
6 For the linear demand function, we have necessarily [𝜋𝑆𝐹 + 𝜋𝐹𝑆 − 𝜋𝑆𝑆 − 𝜋𝐹𝐹] > 0. 
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(A2) Cooperative R&D occurring in a single lab; 
(A3) Neither patent protection available, nor imitation of technology possible; 
(A4) Technology transfer under non-cooperative R&D not allowed; 
(A5) There is no asymmetry of information. 
We shall relax one or the other assumption stated above and examine whether, or to what 
extent, Marjit (1991) results will undergo a change. In particular, we show that the qualitative 
result of Marjit (1991) will remain unchanged even if we introduce patent protection, imitation, 
technology transfer or incomplete information in the analysis although incentives for 
cooperative or non-cooperative research will be affected.7 On the other hand, if we consider 
cooperative research in two labs (hence duplicating research), the result of Marjit (1991) will 
substantially change. We shall also compare Marjit (1991) result with the case when there are 
more than one conceivable innovation. 
 
2.1 Patent Protection and Imitation   
First consider that patent protection for a new innovation is available, hence it prevents 
imitation. Further note that patent protection cannot affect the expected cooperative payoff   
because both firms have always the same access to information -- patent is granted to the R&D 
cooperation.8 Under non-cooperative R&D if only one firm is successful to innovate, it gets 
patent protection. But when both the firms are successful, we assume that each firm will get 
patent protection with probability ½. This partly takes care of the fact that getting a patent 
protection may sometimes be uncertain (Mukherjee and Ray, 2009). Assuming drastic 
innovation along with patent protection, the expected payoff under cooperative R&D will be 
as usual given by (1), but the expression of the expected payoff under non-cooperative R&D 
will be accordingly modified to get:  
𝐸(𝑁𝐶1(𝑎)) = [
𝜌2
2
+  𝜌(1 − 𝜌)]𝜋𝑚 + (1 − 𝜌)2𝜋 − 𝑅                                   (4)     
                                                          
7 In an interesting paper Bandyopadhyay and Mukherjee (2014) have shown that the possibility of entry by a 
non-innovating firm may also affect the incentive for cooperative R&D depending on the extent of spillover of 
knowledge. 
8 Given the possibility of infringement of patents, Marjit et al. (2001) have shown that the patent infringement 
agreements between the innovating firms may act as cooperation in R&D. 
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Then comparing (1) and (4), cooperative R&D is to be preferred to non-cooperative R&D if 
and only if 𝐸(𝐶0) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶1(𝑎)), that is, if and only if  
   𝜌(1 − 𝜌) <
𝑅
2[𝜋𝑚−(𝜋𝑑+𝜋)]
−
[𝜋𝑚−2𝜋𝑑]
2[𝜋𝑚−(𝜋𝑑+𝜋)]
 𝜌2                                                   (5) 
Since the RHS of (5) is  a falling (and concave) function of 𝜌, comparing Marjit (1991) (hence 
(3)), one can easily see that the probability interval for non-cooperative R&D goes up, 
therefore, patent protection gives a larger incentive for non-cooperative R&D. Note that  
𝑅𝐻𝑆(𝜌 = 1) < 0   for   𝑅 < 𝜋𝑚 − 2𝜋𝑑  
Therefore, when 𝑅 < 𝜋𝑚 − 2𝜋𝑑 , ∃?̃? such that non-cooperative R&D is preferred ∀𝜌 ∈ (?̃?, 1).9  
Now consider that patent protection is not available and each firm is capable to imitate the 
other’s innovation perfectly. Hence in this case under non-cooperative R&D, the market will 
always be duopoly. Then, the expected payoff of a firm under non-cooperative R&D will be: 
𝐸(𝑁𝐶1(𝑏)) = [𝜌2 +  2𝜌(1 − 𝜌)]𝜋𝑑 + (1 − 𝜌)2𝜋 − 𝑅                                  (6) 
Hence,  
𝐸(𝐶0) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶(1(𝑏))    ⟺     𝜌(1 − 𝜌) <
𝑅
2(𝜋𝑑−𝜋)
                                        (7)         
Thus even when imitation is possible, the basic qualitative result of Marjit (1991) remains 
unaltered. But comparing the RHS of (3) and (7), we see that 
𝑅
2(𝜋𝑑−𝜋)
>
𝑅
2[𝜋𝑚−(𝜋𝑑+𝜋)]
, this 
means the relevant probability interval for cooperative R&D goes up, hence imitation increases 
incentives for cooperative research. 
So we can write the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: Patent protection in Marjit (1991) model enhances R&D incentives for non-
cooperative R&D whereas imitation does reduce it. 
 
2.2 Technology Transfer under Non-cooperative R&D 
The possibility of technology transfer under non-cooperative R&D arises when only one firm 
comes up with a non-drastic process innovation successfully10 and the innovator shares its 
knowledge with the other firm against some payment. Further, assume that there is neither 
                                                          
9 We show later that in Combs (1992) non-cooperative R&D is preferred to cooperative only for small values of 
the probability of success. 
10 Mukherjee and Marjit (2004) have introduced technology transfer in Combs (1992) framework and Kabiraj and 
Kabiraj (2019) in Marjit (1991) framework. The latter paper studies the choice of R&D organization when the 
form of R&D cooperation is also endogenously determined. 
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patent protection nor imitation of the innovation. We consider fee licensing, that is, licensing 
of the superior technology under a fixed fee contract. The licensing contract takes place only 
on ex post innovation when it is profitable. 
Following Marjit (1990) and others, fee licensing in a duopoly is profitable if and only if the 
post licensing industry profit is larger than the pre-licensing industry profit,11 that is,  
2𝜋𝑆𝑆 > 𝜋𝑆𝐹 + 𝜋𝐹𝑆 
For the linear demand function and also for the general demand function (but with some 
restriction), the condition will hold if and only if ε < 𝜀0, that is, the size of the innovation is 
below a critical level. In the remaining analysis we continue to assume that 
 𝜋𝑆𝐹 + 𝜋𝐹𝑆 ≷ 2𝜋𝑆𝑆   ⟺   ε ≷ 𝜀0 
Therefore, given that the size of the innovation is small, the expected payoff of a firm under 
non-cooperative R&D (with technology transfer) is: 
𝐸(𝑁𝐶2) = 𝜌2𝜋𝑆𝑆 + 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)( 𝜋𝑆𝑆 + 𝐹) + (1 − 𝜌)𝜌 (𝜋𝑆𝑆 − 𝐹) + (1 − 𝜌)2𝜋𝐹𝐹 − 𝑅 
where 𝐹 is the license fee given by 𝐹 = 𝜋𝑆𝑆 − 𝜋𝐹𝑆. Hence,  
𝐸(𝑁𝐶2) =  𝜌(2 − 𝜌)𝜋𝑆𝑆 + (1 − 𝜌)2𝜋𝐹𝐹 − 𝑅                                             (8)                                 
Since we have considered non-drastic process innovation, the expected payoff under 
cooperative R&D will be given by the expression of 𝐸(𝐶 ∗) in (1*) 
Therefore, given that technology transfer is profitable (i.e., ε < 𝜀0), cooperative R&D will 
occur if and only if,  
 𝐸(𝐶 ∗) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶2)     ⟺   𝜌(1 − 𝜌) <
𝑅
2(𝜋𝑆𝑆−𝜋𝐹𝐹)
                                         (9) 
This means, the qualitative result of Marjit (1991) remains unchanged even if we allow the 
possibility of technology transfer. Comparing the RHS of (3*) and (9), we see that      
        
𝑅
2[𝜋𝑆𝐹+𝜋𝐹𝑆−𝜋𝑆𝑆−𝜋𝐹𝐹] 
>
𝑅
2(𝜋𝑆𝑆−𝜋𝐹𝐹)
, since ε < 𝜀0 
This means, the probability interval of cooperative research falls under technology transfer, 
hence technology transfer increases incentives for non-cooperative research.12  
Proposition 3: Possibility of technology transfer increases the incentive for non-cooperative 
R&D. 
                                                          
11 If, in this structure, we include the possibility of a royalty contract, then royalty contract will strictly dominate 
fee contract, and royalty contract is always profitable (see Wang, 1998). 
12 See also Mukherjee (2005) for similar result. 
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2.3 Cooperative Research in Two Labs 
Marjit (1991) assumed that cooperative research occurs in one lab. By this the firms can save 
their R&D costs. In Combs (1992), cooperative R&D occurs in each of their labs. Doing 
research in two labs implies duplicating the research effort. There is no R&D cost saving. Yet 
in the context of Marjit (1991) model it can be shown that doing cooperative research in two 
labs independently and sharing the results of R&D can sometimes be a better option.13 Under 
cooperative agreement if at least one firm is successful, both the firms will have access to the 
innovation. This occurs with probability  𝜌(2 − 𝜌) > 𝜌.  
Assuming drastic innovation, the expected payoffs of each firm under cooperative R&D will 
be: 
𝐸(𝐶3) =  𝜌(2 − 𝜌)𝜋𝑑 + (1 − 𝜌)2𝜋 − 𝑅                                                               (10) 
The expected payoff under non-cooperative R&D is given by 𝐸(𝑁𝐶0) in (2). 
We can check that in this case  
 𝐸(𝑁𝐶0) > 𝐸(𝐶3) ∀𝜌                                                                                     (11) 
because 𝜋𝑚 > 2𝜋𝑑 for homogeneous good. Thus if cooperative research is to conduct in two 
labs, then cooperative research will never occur. Although under cooperative research success 
occurs with a higher probability, but this gain is not sufficient to compensate the loss due to 
having no cost saving under cooperative R&D. Therefore duplicating research with drastic 
innovation does not yield any incentive for cooperative research vis-à-vis non-cooperative 
research.14  
Proposition 4: When cooperative research is to occur in two labs, non-cooperative R&D will 
strictly dominate cooperative R&D. 
It will be interesting in this context to compare the results with the case of Combs (1992) type 
research. Combs (1992) assumed to have multiple research projects (say, 𝑚 ≥ 2) out of which 
only one project is successful. Hence under non-cooperative R&D, the probability of success 
is 𝜌 = (1/𝑚). Under cooperative research the R&D cooperation will select two projects, one 
for each lab; hence the probability of success under cooperative research is  2𝜌 = (2/𝑚).  
At this moment without restricting to drastic or non-drastic innovation, the expected payoff of 
a firm under cooperative R&D will be: 
                                                          
13 This can be the case when the probability of success lies in an intermediate interval. See Kabiraj and Kabiraj 
(2019). 
14 Note that `drastic’ innovation means innovation size is sufficiently large and we get the result that non-
cooperative research strictly dominates cooperative research. If, instead of drastic innovation we consider non-
drastic innovation, then cooperative research will be the choice if and only if the size of the innovation is 
sufficiently small. 
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𝐸(𝐶3𝑎) = 2𝜌𝜋𝑆𝑆 + (1 − 2𝜌)𝜋𝐹𝐹 − 𝑅                                                          (12)  
But the expected payoff under non-cooperative R&D will be given by 𝐸(𝑁𝐶 ∗) in (2*) 
Therefore, 
𝐸(𝐶3𝑎) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶 ∗)    ⟺     𝜌 >
𝜋𝑆𝐹+𝜋𝐹𝑆−2𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝜋𝑆𝐹+𝜋𝐹𝑆−(𝜋𝑆𝑆+𝜋𝐹𝐹)
≡ 𝜌0 < 1                      (13) 
Combs (1992) assumed product innovation (or drastic process innovation), i.e., 𝜋𝑆𝐹 = 𝜋𝑚 and 
𝜋𝐹𝑆 = 0 . Further, in Combs (1992), 𝜋𝐹𝐹 = 0, (although it is not required for the result). Then 
(13) is reduced to the following Combs (1992) condition: 
 𝜌 >
𝜋𝑚 − 2𝜋𝑑
𝜋𝑚−𝜋𝑑
 ≡ 𝜌𝑐 ;     0 < 𝜌𝑐 < 1                                                                (14) 
This gives that cooperative R&D occurs when the probability of success is above a critical 
level, i.e., 𝜌 ∈ (𝜌𝑐, 1]. In contrary, in the context of Marjit (1991) with cooperative research 
in two labs, cooperative R&D never occurs (see (11)). 
Now consider non-drastic innovation, hence consider (13). We have already taken that 𝜋𝑆𝐹 +
𝜋𝐹𝑆 ≷ 2𝜋𝑆𝑆 according as ε ≷ 𝜀0. Therefore if ε > 𝜀0 (including the case of drastic 
innovation), (13) yields 0 < 𝜌0 < 1 and we shall get back Combs (1992) result. On the other 
hand, if we assume ε ≤ 𝜀0, we will have 𝜌0 ≤ 0. In this case cooperative R&D is always 
preferred to non-cooperative R&D irrespective of the size of 𝜌. The size of the innovation 
determines the critical value of 𝜌. 
 
2.4 R&D under Incomplete Information 
In Marjit (1991) there is no asymmetry of information. So we can think asymmetric information 
about the success and failure of R&D. Under cooperative R&D this will not matter because the 
firms do research jointly. But under non-cooperative R&D, assume that the firms have 
asymmetric information, that is, whether or not a firm is successful to innovate is private 
information. However, the rival has a prior belief about the outcome. Details of the model can 
be found in Kabiraj and Chatterjee (2015). It is shown that incomplete information about the 
R&D outcome reduces the expected payoff of a firm under non-cooperative R&D, therefore, 
compared to complete information, incomplete information increases incentives for 
cooperative research. However, the qualitative result of Marjit (1991) goes through.15 
                                                          
15 Chattopadhyay and Kabiraj (2015) have shown that under incomplete information about the size of the 
innovation, the qualitative result of Marjit (1991) will hold irrespective of whether it is quantity or price 
competition in the product market.  
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2.5 Conceivable Two Innovations 
In this subsection we consider conceivable two products (say X and Y) which could be 
innovated by the firms. To simplify the algebra, assume that products are independent and 
market demands for the products are identical. 
As before, Innovation of each such good involves an investment  𝑅 > 0, and innovation is 
uncertain. Further, one firm cannot take more than one research project at a time. We continue 
to assume no patent protection and no imitation,16 as in Marjit (1991). While the probability of 
success of one research lab is 𝜌, but a firm chooses X or Y with probability ½. 
Then expected payoff under non-cooperative R&D will be given by, 
 𝐸(𝑁𝐶5) = (
1
2
) 𝜌𝜋𝑚 + (
1
2
)[𝜌2𝜋𝑑 + 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝜋𝑚] − 𝑅                  (15) 
Now consider cooperative R&D. If it occurs in a single lab, the firms can choose any product. 
then the expected payoff of a firm under cooperative R&D will be 
 𝐸(𝐶5(𝑖)) = 𝜌𝜋𝑑 −
𝑅
2
.  
Then 
 𝐸(𝐶5(𝑖)) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶5) if and only if  
𝑅
2(𝜋𝑚−𝜋𝑑)
>  𝜌 − (𝜌2/2).  
One can check that the RHS is an increasing function of 𝜌, hence cooperative R&D is to be 
preferred if and only if the probability of success is small, otherwise non-cooperative R&D is 
preferred. This is reverse of Combs (1992) result. 
On the other hand, if cooperative research occurs in two labs, they can take the same research 
project in both labs or different research projects in different labs. The corresponding expected 
payoffs of a firm will be respectively, 
𝐸(𝐶5(𝑖𝑖)) = [𝜌2 + 2𝜌(1 − 𝜌)]𝜋𝑑 − 𝑅 = 𝜌(2 − 𝜌)]𝜋𝑑 − 𝑅                  
𝐸(𝐶5(𝑖𝑖𝑖)) = [2𝜌2 + 2𝜌(1 − 𝜌)]𝜋𝑑 − 𝑅 = 2𝜌𝜋𝑑 − 𝑅                   
                                                          
16 For the case of patent protection or imitation and for further details see Kabiraj (2006). 
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Since we have E(𝐶5(𝑖𝑖𝑖)) >  𝐸(𝐶5(𝑖𝑖)), the research cooperation will take different research 
projects in different labs. Then cooperative R&D will be preferred to non-cooperative R&D if 
and only if  
 𝐸(𝐶5(𝑖𝑖𝑖)) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶5)  ⟺   𝜌 > 𝜌∗ ≡
2[𝜋𝑚−2𝜋𝑑]
𝜋𝑚−𝜋𝑑
                                       (16) 
Now,  
𝜌∗ < 1    iff    𝜋𝑚 < 3𝜋𝑑                                                                               (17) 
Therefore, if 𝜋𝑚 < 3𝜋𝑑 , cooperative R&D will dominate non-cooperative R&D for all 𝜌 ∈
(𝜌∗, 1]. This is similar to Combs (1992) result. On the contrary, if 𝜋𝑚 ≥ 3𝜋𝑑 , (so that 𝜌∗ ≥ 1), 
non-cooperative R&D will dominate cooperative R&D.     
 
3. Possible Extensions 
In our brief survey on the choice of R&D institution or organization, we have restricted to 
Marjit (1991) framework and discussed whether, or to what extent, Marjit Result will undergo 
a change with respect to different assumptions related to R&D investment. However, there are 
some issues which are important but not yet fully explored in the literature. The future 
researchers and scholars may find it interesting to explore these issues further. 
We have shown that the size of the innovation is an important determinant of the choice 
between cooperative and non-cooperative research. The present work assumes that the level of 
R&D investment, and hence the size of the innovation, is exogenous. In our context, therefore, 
one may endogenously determine the size of the innovation and then examine the choice of 
R&D organization in the presence of uncertainty in R&D. It might also be interesting to study 
the implication of the R&D cost having its variable component. 
In our analysis, R&D success is uncertain, but the probability of success is assumed constant 
and exogenously fixed. However, probability of success, to a large extent, depends on the R&D 
organization itself and on the level of R&D investment. This means, probability of success in 
cooperative R&D might not only differ from that in the non-cooperative R&D, but, more 
importantly, it can be endogenously determined. To the extent there is coordination problem 
under cooperative research, the same level of R&D investment will lead to different 
probabilities of success under cooperative and non-cooperative R&D. This consideration will 
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perhaps provide a new dimension and further insight into the choice between cooperative and 
non-cooperative R&D. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The present paper has reviewed the choice between cooperative and non-cooperative R&D 
under various scenarios when R&D success is uncertain. In particular, we have studied the 
effect of the change of one or the other assumption underlying Marjit (1991) model. Generally 
low probability of success or large uncertainty induces the choice in favor of cooperative 
research. Similarly, imitation possibility and incomplete information about the size of the 
innovation tilts the choice towards cooperative R&D. On the other hand, availability of patent 
protection, or the compulsion of doing research in multiple labs will reduce the incentive for 
cooperative research.  
We have also suggested some possible extensions of the present work. Research in this 
direction is likely to give a further insight into the problem of R&D and the choice of R&D 
organization. 
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